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Summary 
In 2006 the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) performed a well integrity survey. The 
survey indicated that about 20 % of wells on the Norwegian Continental shelf (NCS) may 
suffer from well integrity issues. Most of the problems were related to deficiency in annulus 
safety valve, tubing, cement and casing. Pressure build-up in annulus, i.e. sustained casing 
pressure, is one of the main indicators of a significant well integrity problem. Increased 
understanding on the field may help engineers to design wells with better integrity in the 
future.  
This thesis describes SCP and its most common causes with emphasis on the relation 
between casing shoe setting depth and the occurrence of SCP. Primary and secondary 
barrier is described together with the common practice of choosing casing shoe depth. 
Formation strength and its impact on setting depth is explained together with a brief 
introduction of the different formation integrity tests.  
Generic cases have been studied to determine the relation between unfavorable casing shoe 
setting depth and the occurrence of SCP. For each case there is a suggestion as how the well 
may be redesigned so that the risk of SCP is reduced. Information on the theme has been 
acquired through studying and comparing different papers, booklets, previous reports and 
reviews concerning the subject. The Norsok standard D-010 and 117 – OLF recommended 
guidelines for well integrity have also been very informative during the study.  
To be able to avoid SCP and at the same time improve well design, it is important to properly 
understand how SCP arises. Changing the casing shoe setting depth to a more suited depth 
or formation cannot alone eliminate SCP. To eliminate SCP a good conversion between Top 
of Cement (TOC) and setting depth of the previous casing shoe is required. The best way of 
avoiding SCP because of casing shoe setting depth is to make a thorough investigation of the 
underground and carefully choose the setting depth. 
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Sammendrag 
En studie utført av petroleumstilsynet i 2006 viste at rundt 20 % av brønnene på den norske 
kontinentalsokkelen hadde indikasjon på brønnintegritetsproblemer. De fleste problemene 
var relatert til barriere svikt i sikkerhetsventiler i ringrommet, produksjonsrør, sement og 
foringsrør. Trykkoppbygning i Ringrommet (SCP) er en av hovedindikatorene på at en brønn 
har integritets problemer. Økt forståelse på området kan føre til brønner med bedre design 
og integritet i fremtiden. 
Denne oppgaven omhandler først og fremst sammenhengen mellom settedybden på 
foringsrøret og forekomst av SCP under produksjon. Innledningsvis er prinsippene og de 
vanligste årsakene for SCP beskrevet. Primær og sekundær barrierekonvoluttene er viktige 
elementer som må fungere for å unngå trykkoppbygning. Det gis derfor en innføring i 
hvordan disse er bygd opp for en brønn i produksjon. For å kunne sammenligne boring og 
produksjon, og finne forbedringsmuligheter er den konvensjonelle metoden for valg av 
settedybde beskrevet. 
Valg av settedybde avhenger av mange faktorer og det er viktig at dataene man arbeider 
med er mest mulig nøyaktig. Formasjonsstyrke er en meget viktig faktor og har mye å si for 
om settedybden er gunstig. Hvordan formasjonsstyrke kan bestemmes ved hjelp av 
integritetstester er derfor kort beskrevet. 
Forskjellige generiske tilfeller ble undersøkt for å finne sammenhengen mellom settedybde 
og forekomst av SCP. Til hvert tilfelle er det fremstilt et forslag til hvordan foringrørsplanen 
kan revideres slik at muligheten for SCP reduseres. Informasjon rundt temaet er funnet i 
artikler, hefter og eldre rapporter. Norsok standarden D-010 og 117 – OLF anbefalte 
retningslinjer for brønnintegritet har òg vært til stor hjelp under arbeidet. 
For å være best mulig rustet til å unngå SCP og å forbedre brønnintegriteten er det viktig å 
ha en best mulig forståelse for hvordan SCP oppstår. Å endre foringsrørskoens settedybde til 
en bedre egnet dybde kan ikke alene fjerne SCP. SCP som oppstår på grunn av settedybde er 
ofte et resultat av dårlig konversjon mellom topp av sement kolonne og settedybden til det 
foregående foringsrøret. Den beste måten å forebygge SCP med opphav i settedybde er å 
foreta grundige undersøkelser av undergrunnen og velge settedybden med omhu.  
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1 Introduction 
In 2006 a ''pilot well integrity survey'' was performed by the Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway. The objective of the project was to determine to what extent wells on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf suffer from integrity problems, the main issues and challenges. 
The survey would be used to ensure safe wells (Vignes, et al., 2006). 
PSA categorized the wells suffering from an integrity problem by failure type. Most of the 
problems were related to well barrier failures in tubing, annulus safety valve, cement and 
casing. Figure 1.1 illustrates number of wells with the different barrier element failure types. 
 
Figure 1.1: Number of wells suffering from different barrier element failure. (Vignes & 
Aadnoy 2008) 
 
Seven companies were contacted and asked to share information concerning well conditions 
on pre-selected offshore facilities. To get a representative selection of wells both injectors 
and producers were assessed. The range of wells varied in age and had different 
development categories. The study showed that about 20 % of the wells were suffering from 
well integrity problems (Vignes, et al., 2006). 
According to the Norsok standard D-010 well integrity is defined as; “application of technical, 
operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation 
fluids throughout the life cycle of a well.” If formation fluids are allowed to flow uncontrolled 
they might find a way to enter the annulus and cause pressure build up, i.e. sustained casing 
pressure. SCP is one of the main indicators and the most common reason for a well to be 
assigned of having a significant well integrity problem. As about 20 % of wells on the NCS 
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may be suffering from integrity problems, ability to control and eliminate SCP may be a key 
element in getting rid of integrity problems and ensure safe wells. 
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) defines sustained casing pressure as; “pressure 
in any well annulus that is measurable at the wellhead and rebuilds when bled down, not 
caused solely by temperature fluctuations or imposed by the operator” (OLF - 117). 
The worst case scenario that may arise as a result of SCP is a blowout that can cause damage 
to the platform, put lives at risk and harm the environment. A solution on eliminating SCP 
will reduce the number of wells suffering from well integrity problems and is therefore of 
common interest. 
In the literature well design is mainly based on the drilling phase. Adjustments and 
precautions are based on happenings and problems that may arise during drilling. The 
operational conditions the well is exposed to during drilling and production is quite different 
and requires different qualities from the well. Very little information exists on the relation 
between the production phase and SCP. If both drilling and production not are taken into 
consideration when the well is drilled one may develop problems like SCP.  
Sustained casing pressure may have many reasons of origin, but not all causes are 
thoroughly investigated. Unfavorable casing shoe depth is a source to SCP that should be 
better investigated.  
An operator on the NCS has performed a survey of their wells and categorized them after 
the color system. As much as 70% of their wells that were categorized as orange might have 
had integrity problems related to the conversion between casing shoe setting depth and TOC 
of previous casing string.1 How wells are categorized with different colors in the “traffic light 
system” is explanation is Appendix A.  
The objective of this thesis is to find out to how unfavorable intermediate casing shoe depth 
may cause SCP and how it may be avoided. A proposal on how casing shoe setting depth can 
be chosen differently to avoid SCP will be presented. The proposal will be based on 
comparison of preferred setting depth from a drilling and production point of view. 
  
                                                     
1
 Information acquired through personal communication with Torbjørn Vrålstad at Sintef Petroleum Research 
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2 Sustained Casing Pressure 
Sustained casing pressure is defined by OLF as: “pressure in any well annulus that is 
measurable at the wellhead and rebuilds when bled down, not caused solely by temperature 
fluctuations or imposed by the operator” (OLF – 117 2011). 
If all well barriers are intact, the downhole equipment is undamaged and the cement job is 
fulfilling the Norsok standard, sustained casing pressure should not occur. Unfortunately this 
is not always the case and SCP is allowed to arise due to failure in one or more of the well 
barrier elements. Depending on how severe the integrity problem is, the well is assigned a 
color based on the “traffic light system”. Green indicates a healthy well while red indicates a 
well where both barrier envelopes are damaged. Yellow and orange indicates a condition in 
between. The traffic light categorization is more detailed described in Appendix A. 
During installation damage to the equipment may occur. Casing strings and production 
tubing may get broken during setting and downhole operations. Casing connections and 
packers which shall seal the well may not be tight causing leaks. SCP may also be caused by 
migration of fluids from formations along the wellbore into the well. According OLF 117 SCP 
caused by influx of fluids from formation zones along the wellbore causes the most 
challenging situations to manage and eliminate.  
Once a leak path is established and there is a pressure difference, nature will try to equalize 
the pressure. SCP may be hard to remove because of constantly migrating fluid from the 
source. It can often be controlled by surveillance and regularly bleedoff operations. The 
symptoms may be removed for a while but pressure will usually rebuild. How fast the 
pressure rebuilds depends on the pressure difference and the size of the leak path.    
The leak rate should not be neglected when the risks associated with SCP occurrence is 
evaluated. The time it takes for the pressure to rebuild after a bleedoff operation is 
measured to determine the extent and dimension of the leak. If sand or other particles are 
present in the fluid the magnitude of the leakage can quickly escalate because of erosion. 
When the potential hazard posed by the SCP is determined, both leak rate and magnitude of 
the pressure should be taken into consideration when determining how the leak rate should 
be dealt with (Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
There are many examples from the industry where SCP has been detected and the risk 
involved underestimated. Figure 2.1 shows a blowout resulting from SCP. In the technical 
report “A Review of Sustained Casing Pressure Occurring on the OCS” by Adam T. Bourgoyne 
et al. some examples from the industry are mentioned. When SCP was detected the 
platform applied for, and was granted a departure from the Mineral Management Service 
(MMS). Production continued as normal and the SCP was monitored. 
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In one of the cases two wells that had been producing for about six years developed SCP on 
the production casing. Since the shut-in casing pressure was 3400 psi and the maximum 
internal yield was 6900 psi the operator argued that it was safe to continue the operation 
and a departure was granted. After producing for two more years a blowout occurred 
between production casing and surface casing. It is estimated that about 600 MMSCF of gas 
and 3200 Bbl. of condensate escaped the well during the 46 days the well was out of control. 
Pollution from the blowout was found on about four miles of beach. The platform tipped 
over when the well cratered and both platform and well had to be abandoned (Bourgoyne et 
al. 1999). 
In another case SCP was found in the production tubing five years after production start. A 
departure was granted for one year. At the end of this period the pressure was ranging 
between 1400 and 1800 psi and the departure was renewed. After about six months the 
pressure started to fluctuate and bubbles were observed in the water below the platform.   
A blowout was confirmed in a side-tracked well. Before the well was killed by a relief well, 
the platform started to shift and settle because the ground below one of the platform legs 
had started to erode. 6,75*10E6 cubic feet of sand was needed to keep the platform stable 
during the relief well drilling operation. In all, the operation of gaining total control over the 
platform lasted for two years. During this time the other wells on the platform had to be 
temporarily shut down (Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Picture of a blowout resulting from SCP (Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
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2.1 Age Relation 
In the survey performed by the PSA it was found a clear relation between the age of the 
wells and the occurrence of SCP. In Figure 2.2 it can be seen that the integrity issue on 
average is twice as high for wells from the early 1990’s than for earlier drilled wells  
Figure 2.2 indicates that wells from 1992 to 2006 represent a peak for integrity occurrence. 
What separates new wells from old wells may be the completion time. Focus on fast drilling 
and cementing may lead to a less precise performance of the job which again increases the 
probability of SCP. Modern wells may also be more prone to SCP because they are more 
complex than old wells. By using more advanced equipment in the wells, new potential 
sources of errors that may lead to SCP are introduced. Of the 406 wells that were evaluated, 
75 were found to be suffering from an integrity problem.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Age of wells with integrity issues.  75 out of 406 wells show integrity problems. 
The majority of these wells are from the early 1990’s (Vignes et al. 2006). 
 
2.2 Leak Source 
Sustained casing pressure may have many reasons of origin. Figure 2.3 shows some of the 
different leak paths that can develop within a well. Some most common failures resulting in 
SCP are leaks through casing or tubing, intrusion of fluids from surrounding formations and 
leaks through packers and wellhead seals (Vignes & Aadnoy 2008). 
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Figure 2.3: Different leak paths in a well (OLF-117 2011). 
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2.2.1 Leakage from Tubing and Casing 
During setting and mechanical downhole operations cracks and rupture on casing and tubing 
may be inflicted by the equipment used leading to leakage and SCP. The well is experiencing 
large temperature differences that induce thermal stresses. As a result of these stresses the 
casing may crack. Poor thread connections and corrosion may also cause SCP (Bourgoyne et 
al. 1999). If corrosive agents such as H2S, CO2 or O2 are present they should be monitored 
and be kept within the design limitations to reduce the chance of SCP (OLF – 117 2011). 
The well is designed in such a way that the innermost casings are the strongest and the 
production casing is usually the only casing designed to withstand reservoir pressure 
(Bourgoyne et al. 1999). If a leak occurs in the production casing reservoir pressure is 
allowed to build up in annulus “b”. Since the next casing usually not is designed to withstand 
reservoir pressure it may burst and the pressure will work its way outwards in the well. If the 
pressure not is stopped an underground blowout may take place.  
Experience from the industry has shown that the most catastrophic incidents because of SCP 
have been related to leakage in the production tubing. Worst case scenario is an 
underground blowout causing damage to the platform, putting workers in danger and 
polluting the environment (Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
Different methods are developed to identify leaks in the well. In one of the methods the 
pressure in the inner string is varied while it is observed if there is any corresponding 
pressure response in adjacent strings. Another method is to perform a bleedoff test and see 
whether the pressure rebuilds. If it does, SCP is present. If the leak is of serious extent it can 
be identified from production data by plotting tubing and casing pressure versus time 
(Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
The annuli have been denoted alphabetically where the first annulus between production 
tubing and production casing is named annulus “a”. The next annulus between production 
casing and the intermediate is named annulus “b” and so on. Figure 2.4 shows a simple well 
design with conductor casing, surface casing, intermediate casing, production casing, 
production liner and tubing. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with 
red color. The names of the annuli “a”, “b”, “c” and “d” are indicated on their respective 
annulus. This well design will be used as basis in the example scenarios presented later in the 
report. 
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Figure 2.4: Simple well sketch showing different casing strings, production tubing and liner. 
The letters “a”, “b”, “c” and “d” are indicating different annuli. Primary barrier is marked 
with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
 
2.2.2 Leaks due to Cement Failure  
Cement outside the casing is set to provide an impermeable, zonal isolating sheet that is 
supposed to last throughout the lifetime of the well (Bellabarba et al. 2008). Many things 
can disturb and harm the cement sheet during the cementing process. The cement may 
become brittle and may not respond very well to pressure and temperature induced loads. 
The result may be cracking and forming of channels in the cement. 
There are mainly two reasons SCP occur as a result of cement failure; poor primary cement 
and damage to the primary cement. From the cement is set in a liquid form till it obtains its 
final condition as a solid it goes through different phases. During this process there are many 
parameters contributing that may lead to defects in in the cement (Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
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Even though the primary cement job is well performed, there are still hazards that may 
cause damage to the cement after it is set creating flow paths. Casing and cement reacts in 
different manners when they are exposed to pressure and temperature changes. 
If the cement expands more than the casing during temperature and pressure loads, they 
may get separated generating a micro annulus. An illustration of a micro annulus is shown in 
Figure 2.5. If the micro annulus extends over large intervals, it may provide a good path for 
fluid to migrate and development of SCP. Mechanical shocks occurring during tripping may 
also result in micro annuli generation because of weakening the casing-cement bond 
(Bourgoyne et al. 1999).   
 
 
Figure 2.5: Casing and cement are separated creating a micro annulus 
 
Invasion of formation fluids into the annulus occurs when annulus pressure is lower than the 
formation pressure. In Figure 2.6 the formation pressure, p1 is larger than the pressure 
provided by the cement slurry column, p2. Formation fluids are therefore allowed to migrate 
into the cement slurry. The fluids can migrate all the way to the surface or to a formation 
with lower pressure which also is illustrated in Figure 2.6. To avoid flow from a formation 
into the cement slurry it is important to ensure that the slurry density provides larger 
pressure than the formation. On the other hand it is important that the slurry pressure not 
exceeds the formation fracture gradient to avoid fracturing and loss of slurry and pressure 
(Bonett 1996). 
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Figure 2.6: Migration of formation fluids into the cement slurry and low pressure formation 
because of larger pressure in in the lower formation than in the cement slurry. 
 
Channels formed at liner top and cement shoe can be repaired by squeeze cementing. The 
channels in between can generally not be repaired. It is therefore important to ensure that 
the primary cementing is of good quality. Some factors contributing in cementing is mud 
characteristics, pore pressure and fracture pressure in zones that can get connected through 
channels and create a cross flow (Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
As the cement gels the ability to transmit hydrostatic pressure decreases. This may allow 
fluids to enter the cement and form channels during the setting process. Fluids can originate 
from either the reservoir or other fluid containing formations. No matter how well the 
cement operation is performed, there is no guarantee that the cement is able to resist 
invasion during the hydration process (Bourgoyne et al. 1999). 
If the well not is cemented according to the latest version of the Norsok standard D-010 the 
cement may not qualify as a well barrier element. The requirements can be seen in Table B. 
8 in Appendix B. A common reason for why some old wells may not fulfill the Norsok 
standard D-010 may be that they not are cemented above the production packer. If a leak 
occurs between TOC and the production packer the fluid is outside both barrier envelopes. 
There is nothing to prevent the fluid from entering the formation and in worst case flow to 
the surface. Examples on leaks occurring as a result of cement not covering the production 
packer are presented in case 1 and case 4 later in the report. 
 
2.2.3 Preventive Methods 
It is better and easier to prevent SCP than getting rid of it. If a factor that may cause SCP is 
discovered action should be taken to remove it. 
If there are corrosive agents or sand is present in the produced fluid the well should be 
monitored. Special attention should also be given to make sure it satisfies the production 
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criteria. Erosion and corrosion can be can be monitored through surface samples and by 
downhole inspection such as calliper (OLF – 117 2011). 
One should also try to avoid unnecessary loading of the well. Start up and shut in of a well is 
examples of situations where the well is put under unfavorable conditions. Activities causing 
significant changes in temperature and pressure within a short period of time are also 
exposing the well to unfavorable conditions. To avoid defects leading to SCP because of the 
situations described above, procedures on how to perform and handle these situations 
should be developed (OLF – 117 2011). 
When the cement job outside the production casing is planned it is important to consider 
both pore and fracture pressure to be able to design a high enough TOC. It is important that 
TOC is so high that the requirements for setting of the production packer can be acquired 
with a good margin. 
If two fluid bearing zones are supposed to be drilled through with the same mud, precaution 
has to be taken with regards to the cementing. It is important to make sure that the pore 
pressure in the lower zone not is too close to the fracture pressure in the upper zone. Figure 
2.7 shows an example where pore pressure in layer 2 is larger than the fracture pressure in 
layer 1. As a result channels are forming in the cement before it gels and a crossflow may 
form between the two layers. It is also important that as much as possible of the mud cake is 
removed to develop a good cement/formation bond. Residual mud cake may create a route 
for gas to flow up the annulus and lead to SCP. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Pore pressure in layer 2 is larger than the fracturing pressure in layer 1. As a result 
layer one may fracture and a crossflow between the two layers is formed.  
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3 Well barriers 
There are many dangers related to drilling and producing an oil well. To minimize the risk of 
uncontrolled flow of fluids into and out of the well certain precautions have to be made. The 
most important is precaution may be to fulfill the requirements for the well barrier 
envelopes. 
According the Norsok standard there should always be at least two independent barrier 
envelopes in place if a risk of uncontrolled outflow from the well to the external 
environment is present. A barrier envelope is made up of several Well Barrier Elements 
(WBE). Together the WBEs form a closed, sealed system preventing pressure from entering 
and exiting the well. To qualify as a well barrier envelope, each barrier element has to be 
tested in accordance with the Norsok standard D – 010. The requirements can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates where the primary and secondary barrier envelope is located during 
production. Primary barrier is marked with blue color and secondary barrier with red color. 
In this case the primary barrier envelope is made up of, cement behind the production liner, 
the production liner, liner hanger and packer, 9 5/8 in. casing between liner hanger packer 
and production packer, production packer, production tubing and the surface-controlled 
subsurface safety valve. The secondary barrier envelope is made up of the 9 5/8 in. cement, 
9 5/8 in. casing, 9 5/8 in. casing hanger with seal assembly, wellhead/annulus access valves, 
tubing hanger with seals and X-mas tree access valves. 
It is important to remember that the barrier envelope changes with the different well stages. 
Drilling and Production require different qualities form the barrier envelope. The barriers 
which are valid for drilling may therefore not be used in production. An example is drilling 
fluid which is the primary barrier during drilling but not is present during production.  
If the primary barrier fails the secondary barrier is redefined to be the primary barrier. 
Ideally it should be possible to redefine the casing and cement outside the original 
secondary barrier to become the new secondary barrier. TOC of the next casing and setting 
depth of the previous casing along with formation properties decides whether a redefinition 
is possible or not. In Figure 3.1 a redefinition of the 13 3/8 in. casing can be made if the 
formation present in the open hole section qualify as a WBE. 
If unwanted fluid migration cannot be avoided, it is preferable to keep it within the barrier 
envelopes so that SCP can be monitored, controlled and hopefully eliminated. If the fluid is 
allowed to migrate into an annulus outside the barrier envelopes or into a formation it may 
be hard to detect and the outcome may be catastrophic. Inside the annulus pressure may 
build up and exceed the design limitations of the equipment resulting in a blowout. If the 
fluid flows into the formation, the formation itself and groundwater may get polluted. In a 
case where no sealing rock is present the fluid may find a way to migrate all the way to the 
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surface. If fluid is allowed to flow to the surface it may damage to the environment and be 
hazardous to the platform and the people on board. 
Having designed and constructed the well in such a way that the next casing string and 
cement can be redefined as a barrier is therefore a huge advantage. It increases the 
probability to maintain control in a situation with SCP. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Primary barrier envelope is shown with blue color and secondary barrier envelope 
with red color. 
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3.1 The Well Barrier Schematic 
To have important and mutually dependent information gathered in the same place may 
prevent misunderstandings and unfortunate incidents. A properly filled out Well Barrier 
Schematic (WBS) makes this possible.  
It is important to have a proper WBS so that it is clear what is defined as primary and 
secondary barrier. In 2007 no common practice regarding the use of WBS existed, the well 
integrity forum (WIF), which is a part of OLF, was therefor assigned the task to develop a 
common well barrier schematic proposal. The schematic contains a minimum of data to 
ensure that any weaknesses are made aware of and that the actual downhole situation is 
shown. The data have to be filled in by the operator. When the well conditions are changing 
the WBS should be updated. An illustration of a standard WBS is shown in Figure 3.2. 
Primary and secondary barrier are separated by using different colors. According to OLF – 
117, “Recommended Guidelines for Well Integrity”, the minimum data a WBS should contain 
are; 
1. The formation strength should be indicated for formation within the barrier 
envelopes. 
2. Reservoirs should be on the drawing. 
3. Each barrier element in both barrier envelopes should be presented in a table along 
with its initial integrity-verification test results. 
4. Depths should be shown relatively correct according to each barrier element on the 
drawing. 
5. All casing and cement, including the surface casing, should be on the drawing and 
labeled with its size. 
6. There should be separate fields for the following well information: installation, well 
name, well type, well status, rev. no and date, “Prepared by”, “Verified by”. 
7. Include a note field for important well integrity information. 
 
Because formations in an open hole section may be exposed to reservoir pressure it is 
important to always include the formation strength in the well barrier schematic. Knowing 
the formation strength it is easy to calculate whether or not the formation can handle the 
pressure arising during a kick. The formation strength limitation should also be included 
when operational limitations of the well are determined. Methods of determining the these 
limits can be physical measurements made during drilling of the well, core samples, 
downhole logs or correlations based on historical field data (OLF – 117 2011). 
If formations in open hole sections are used as a WBE it is important to know where they are 
located. Knowing their location makes it easier to avoid situations where they are exposed 
to pressure exceeding their strength. If the formation strength is exceeded it may result in 
16 
 
fracturing and leak into the surrounding formation. The fluid may also find its way into the 
next annulus (OLF – 117 2011). 
It is not unusual that formations are present in within barrier envelopes representing a WBE. 
To qualify as a well barrier the formation must be able to withstand any pressure it may be 
exposed during the life of the well. 
It is important that the depths are shown relatively correct in relation to the WBE on the 
WBS. If there is damage on the casing below the production packer it is important to know if 
the packer is set in cemented casing or not. If it is not set in cemented casing the chance of a 
leak leading to SCP is much larger than if it was set in cemented casing. To know that the 
casing setting depth is corresponding to the formation strength is important when deciding 
whether the open hole sections can handle large pressures (OLF – 117 2011). 
Formation strength and relative location of different casing strings and belonging cement 
should be as exact as possible. The robustness estimate of the well will be better the more 
exact the given information is. With these data known the chance of a misinterpretation is 
also less likely (OLF – 117 2011). 
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Figure 3.2: A well barrier schematic illustrating recommended guidelines for what should be 
included in a WBS. Data have to be filled out where xx is stated for a real well (OLF – 117 
2011).  
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4 Casing Shoe Selection 
Common practice today is usually to choose casing shoe setting depth based on the drilling 
process. Selection of casing shoe depth may have different optimal solutions for drilling and 
production.  
4.1 Well Design 
When drilling of a new well is planned it is advantageous to know the pore pressure- and 
fracture gradient of the formation. These data can be obtained from for example nearby 
already drilled wells. Knowing the pressure and fracture profile a mud window, as shown in 
Figure 4.1, can be made. In the diagram the gradients are plotted versus depth. Based on 
these data a program of bit sizes, casing sizes, steel grades and setting depth can be made.   
Because of economic reasons casing strings can be made up of different steel grades, wall 
thickness and coupling types. The potential savings of selecting different steel grades in 
sections of the casing must be considered against additional risks. These risks are associated 
with performance of leak free tieback operations and additional wear resulting from longer 
exposure of the upper casing to rotation and translation of the drill string (Bourgoyne et al. 
1986).  
The combination of different steel grades may also have an important saying in how well the 
well resists SCP. In this thesis the aim is to find out how the setting depth influences the 
occurrence of SCP. The main focus will therefore be on selection of the setting depth and not 
on how different weight, grade and coupling types for the casing are chosen. If the well is 
drilled underbalanced the collapse pressure also has to be taken into consideration, this is 
also not included in the problem to be addressed in this thesis. 
4.2 Setting Depth Based on mud weight 
Deciding the setting depth of a casing string a number of elements has to be taken into 
consideration. Calculations are made to see whether the casing can take loads occurring 
during a kick or underground blowout. 
First step is to design a casing program based on mud weight. A safety margin of 0,5 ppg 
(0,06 s.g.) is commonly used for both pore pressure and fracture gradient to ensure a safe 
operation without kicks and fracturing of the formation (Bourgoyne 1986). A trip margin of 
0,5 ppg is plotted in Figure 4.1 with dashed lines. The setting depth has a strong correlation 
with the mud density used to drill a section. As the well is drilled, the pore pressure is 
increasing and the pressure difference between mud gradient end pore pressure gradient is 
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decreasing. To prevent the two gradient lines from crossing and avoiding a kick the casing 
shoe is set and the mud weight is increased.  
Some places, like in North Sea the mud window may be very tight and drilling a well with a 
safety margin of 0,5 ppg would be impossible. To enable drilling in such places the mud 
window needs to be optimized by using a smaller safety margins. In North Sea it is common 
practice to use a safety margin of 0,08 ppg (0,01 s.g.) for fracturing and 0,25 ppg (0,03 s.g.). 
When designing a well it is common to start with the supposedly last section to be drilled. 
Mud weight equivalent to the pore pressure gradient in point “A” in Figure 4.1 is chosen to 
prevent inflow from the formation i.e. a kick. This mud density cannot be used to drill the 
whole well. At point “B” in Figure 4.1, the formation will have a fracture gradient equivalent 
to this weight. The intermediate casing shall protect the formation at this point and to 
surface from the pressure exerted on it from the mud. The intermediate casing therefore has 
to extend at least to point “B”. Then the mud density needed to drill to point B and set the 
intermediate casing is chosen equivalent to the fluid density shown in point “C”. Choosing 
mud density at point “C” implies that the surface casing has to be set at point “D” to avoid 
fracturing the formation. All points are if possible chosen on the safety margin line 
(Bourgoyne et al. 1986).  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Mud Window with trip margin and correlating Well Design 
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Protection of fresh water aquifers, lost circulation zones, salt beds and low pressure zones 
which may cause stuck pipe are factors that needs to be taken into consideration and 
influence the setting depth. Setting depths obtained by using the method described above 
are shown in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1: Casing size and belonging setting depth based on mud weight. 
Casing size (in.) Depth (ft.) 
7 16 500 
9 5/8 12 000 
13 3/8 8500 
18 5/8 350 
 
When the setting depth based on mud weight is found, the kick criterion may to be taken 
into consideration. Some changes probably have to be done to the casing setting depths to 
satisfy the new criterion. 
4.3 Setting Depth Based on Kick Criterion 
During drilling kicks from high pressure formations may be passed on the way to the 
reservoir. If the mud pressure cannot withstand the pressure from the formation, a kick may 
occur. By taking the kick criterion into consideration, the setting depth may be chosen so 
that the formation in which the casing is set can withstand the pressure it is exposed to 
during the kick. 
Using this method it is important to do the evaluation based on pressure and not the 
pressure gradients (Aadnoy 2010). Pore pressure and fracture pressure are therefore plotted 
in psi versus depth. An example of pore pressure versus depth is shown in Figure 4.2. 
If the well has been drilled to 12 000 feet and a kick takes place it should be designed to 
handle this. Assuming the formation fluid at this depth is a condensate with density 7,58 ppg 
(0,91 s.g.), constant density and no expansion during circulation. When the kick takes place 
the well will be filled with condensate and the pressure upward in the well will be reduced 
by the weight of this fluid (Aadnoy 2010). 
In Figure 4.2 the kick fluid gradient is plotted. The point where it crosses the fracture 
pressure line indicates the new casing setting depth. Repeating this gives the other casing 
setting depths. Figure 4.2 shows where the new setting depths have to be to satisfy the kick 
criteria. 
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Figure 4.2: Setting depth based on kick criteria. 
 
The new setting depths that are found using the kick criteria method are summarized in 
Table 4-2.  
 
Table 4-2: Casing size and belonging setting depth based on kick criterion. 
Casing size (in.) Depth (ft.) 
7 16 500 
9 5/8 12 000 
13 3/8 10 000 
18 5/8 2500 
30 1000 
 
If the well is drilled from a floating drilling rig, the riser margin has to be taken into 
consideration deciding the casing setting depth. The riser margin is needed in case the 
drilling vessel has to be disconnected due to for example bad weather. In case of 
disconnection the hydrostatic head created by mud in the riser is replaced by the hydrostatic 
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head of sea water. The pressure difference needs to be balanced. During regular drilling this 
is done by applying a heavier mud. The over pressure created is called the riser margin. 
Including the riser margin in the calculations will affect the casing shoe setting depth 
(Aadnoy 2010). 
 
Numerical Example 
These data are based on the mud window in chapter 4.2 “Setting Depth Based on mud 
weight”. Assuming a kick takes place at 16 500 ft. and the kick fluid is a condensate with 
density of 6,34 ppg (0,76 s.g.) can the formation in which the previous casing shoe is set 
handle the pressure? The density of the condensate is assumed constant and there is no 
expansion during circulation. 
 
Table 4-3: Information on casing size, casing shoe setting depth, pore pressure and fracture 
pressure. 
Casing size  
(in.) 
Depth  
(ft.) 
Pore Pressure  
(psi) 
Fracture Pressure 
(psi) 
7 16 500 14 517 16 096 
9 5/8 12 000 9404 11 213 
13 3/8 8500 3934 7143 
18 5/8 350 - - 
 
Calculating pressure at 12 000 ft. after the kick has taken place: 
Pressure@12 000 ft. = Pore Pressure@16 500 – weight of condensate column 
Pressure@12 000 ft. = 14 517 psi – 0,052*(16 500- 12 000) ft. * 6,34 ppg 
Pressure@12 000 ft. = 13 033 psi 
 
From Table 4-3 it is seen that the formation at 12 000 ft. cannot take more than 11 213 psi 
before it fractures. If the primary barrier fails (which is what happens in Case 4: Leak below 
Production Casing Shoe), and the formation at 12 000 ft. is exposed to reservoir pressure the 
formation will fracture allowing fluids to flow out of the well. 
To find out at what depth the previous casing needs to be set at, the same method as 
deciding setting depth based on the kick criterion in chapter 4.3 can be used. The 
condensate gradient is drawn into a figure together with pore pressure and fracture 
pressure. From Figure 4.3 it can be seen that the production casing has to be set at 14 500 ft. 
or deeper to be able to resist the pressure generated in case of a blowout.  
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Figure 4.3: Condensate gradient drawn in the same figure as formation pore pressure and 
fracture pressure. 
 
4.4 Additional Casing String 
Sometimes, when production requirements are taken into consideration it may be necessary 
to insert an additional casing string to obtain an optimal well design. After inserting the 
additional casing string, drilling can be continued as planned.  
If the extra casing string is inserted between a 20 in. conductor casing a 13 3/8 in. surface 
casing, a 16 in. casing string can be added without making any difference for the production 
casing. An 11 in. casing string can be placed between the 13 3/8 in. surface casing and the 9 
5/8 in. production casing without having any influence on the production liner. If on the 
other hand an extra casing is required between the 9 5/8 in. production casing and the 7 in. 
production liner, a 7 in. production casing can be set resulting in a diameter decrease of the 
production liner to 5 1/2 in. 
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Since the purpose of an exploration well not is to extract large amounts of oil, the reduction 
in liner diameter may not affect the purpose of the well. For a production well the liner 
diameter may determine whether the well is able to produce as planned or not. 
Figure 4.4 shows how setting the 9 5/8 in. casing shallower and inserting an extra 7 in. 
production casing string may allow a deeper setting depth. The dashed line indicates at what 
depth the previous casing string has to be set to allow the extra casing string to be set at the 
new depth. This can be useful if hazardous trouble zones requiring isolation are run into. It 
may also be necessary to set the casing shoe deeper because of formation strength.  
Generally the formation fracture gradient is increasing with depth. This can be used if the 
initially planned setting depth cannot withstand the pressure that may arise during a kick. 
The larger formation strength obtained by setting the casing shoe deeper may satisfy the 
requirements and an underground blowout may be avoided. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: An extra intermediate casing string is utilized. Production casing size is therefore 
reduced from 7 in. to 5 in. 
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As previously mentioned, increased number of casing strings may result in smaller 
production tubing diameter and limited production. It is also time consuming to trip the drill 
string to change the bit and set the new casing. Before deciding to use an extra casing string 
the advantages must be weighed against the extra costs involved together with the reduced 
throughput a reduction in production tubing diameter will lead to.  
Expandable casing or liner may sometimes be used instead of an extra casing string. The 
expandable casing does not hold the same pressure resistance as a conventional casing 
string. It may therefore be disadvantageous to use for this purpose since one of the 
objectives is to increase the pressure resistance in the casing.  
A liner on the other hand can for example be used between the 20 in. and 13 3/8 in. or 13 
3/8 in. and 9 5/8 in casing. By using a liner instead of a casing extending all the way to the 
surface steel costs may be greatly reduced. Using a liner requires additional tools and is a 
complex operation accompanied with additional risk. Pros and cons have to be weighted 
before choosing a liner instead of a casing going all the way to the top of the well 
(Schlumberger, ID: 1464). 
If the extra casing needs to be set after the production casing it may be advantageous to let 
the casing string go all the way to the surface. This is to prevent the previous casing string 
(that usually can take less pressure) from experiencing reservoir pressure.2 
4.5 Pressure Integrity Tests 
Pressure integrity tests may be used to determine the formation strength and formation 
integrity. Knowing the formation strength at different depths may help choosing the most 
favorable casing shoe setting depth. 
In chapter “4.2 Setting Depth Based on mud weight” it is shown how the setting depth is 
chosen based on a combination of pore pressure and fracture gradient. The fracture 
gradient is based on the different pressure integrity tests and is therefore strongly related to 
casing shoe setting depth. Having good formation integrity tests that can give good 
estimates for the formation strength is very important to be able to choose the best suited 
setting depth. 
The recommendation from PSA to include formation strength in the WBS is relatively new 
and makes it easier to stay within the limitations. Exceeding the formation strength may lead 
to fracturing of the formation, leaks and uncontrolled SCP outside the barrier envelopes. The 
different methods used to obtain formation strength may have different accuracy and 
meaning. It is therefore very important to always include the method used to find the values 
in the WBS.  
                                                     
2
 Information acquired through personal communication with Sigbjørn Sangesland 18.05.2012. 
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In this chapter the leak of test (LOT), the extended leak of test (XLOT) and the formation 
integrity test (FIT), which all are used to describe the formation, will be briefly described. 
 
4.5.1 Leak-off Test 
The leak-off test is an important factor when the well integrity is evaluated. It is usually 
performed after a casing shoe is set to make sure the shoe and casing are fulfilling the 
requirements to well integrity. 
Leak-off tests can be used to estimate the maximum pressure a casing shoe can withstand. 
Knowing this value, the maximum mud weight that can be used to drill the next section can 
be calculated (Addis et al. 1998). To make sure the cement and formation below the casing 
shoe can withstand the pressure exerted on them during drilling of the next section, they 
may also be leak-off tested (Bourgoyne et al. 1986). 
The LOT is performed by closing the well at the surface and increasing the well pressure by 
pumping with a constant rate. The pumping is stopped when the test pressure is reached or 
the injection pressure starts to divert from the trend line. Figure 4.5 shows a typical leak-off 
test.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: A typical leak off test (Bourgoyne et al. 1986). 
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Because of the constant pump rate, a plot of injection pressure versus pump rate will give a 
relatively straight line up to point “A” as seen in Figure 4.5. At point “A” the formation grains 
are starting to move apart allowing mud to flow into the formation. Because mud is escaping 
the wellbore the injection pressure is decreasing and starts to divert from the trend line. The 
pressure that can be read at point “A” is called the Leak-Off Pressure (LOP) and is used to 
calculate the formation fracture gradient.  
To make sure the fracture pressure has been reached, the pump is not turned off before 
point “B” is reached. After point “B” the pressure decrease is plotted versus time instead of 
pump rate. The rate at which the pressure decreases may tell something about the mud flow 
from the well into the formation (Bourgoyne et al. 1986). 
A leak-off test is quite harmful and may leave the well in a worse condition than it was 
before the test was carried out. When it is really necessary to know how far it is possible to 
drill into the next formation the LOT may be used. 
Because regular LOT may vary in accuracy, the need for a more precise method led to the 
development of the extended leak-off test.  
 
4.5.2 Extended Leak-off Test 
An extended leak-off test is a regular leak-off test followed by one or more pressure build up 
cycles. Figure 4.6 shows an idealized pressure response of a XLOT with three pressure cycles. 
In cycle one the pressure is increased until leak-off and the leak-off pressure is read. To 
overcome the tensile strength two more cycles are carried out. When the pressure starts to 
divert from the trend line on the second and third cycle the fracture propagation pressure is 
read.  
From Figure 4.6 it can be seen that the pressures required to inflict a fracture is greater than 
the pressure needed to reopen it. The second and third cycle gives a better estimate of the 
minimum stress magnitude than the first cycle  and is why the XLOT is preferred to estimate 
the fracture gradient (Addis et al. 1998). 
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Figure 4.6: Idealized example of an XLOT with three cycles (Addis et al. 1998). 
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4.5.3 Formation Integrity Test 
In a formation integrity test, the aim is not to give the fracture gradient a number. The aim is 
to confirm that formations below the casing shoe holds acceptable integrity conditions and 
is able to handle the pressure needed to drill the next section.  
The FIT is often used if there is a suspicion that a formation along the well path is weaker 
than the trend, i.e. the formation strength is not increasing as expected with regards to the 
depth.  
The test is carried out by pressurizing the well towards a predefined value. Preferably a 
pressure with a magnitude less than the fracture re-opening pressure found during the XLOT 
to prevent the induced fracture to reopen. From the known density of the drilling fluid and 
predefined formation integrity pressure, the pressure that needs to be induced at surface 
can be calculated as seen below in equation 2.  
FIT
FIT s e
p
p gD p
gD
    
 (1)
 
 
FITp   Predefined maximum pressure 
   Density of mud  
g   Gravity (9,81 kg/m*s2) 
D   Vertical depth of the well 
sp   Pressure induced at surface 
e   Derived density equivalent 
 
Since the surrounding formation is not exposed to a pressure exceeding its fracture 
pressure, the FIT is less harmful than the LOT and is preferable with regards to ensuring the 
integrity of casing shoe and formation. 
 
Short sum up 
In short the different pressure integrity tests are used to evaluate the casing shoe strength 
and the surrounding formation. The LOT and XLOT can be used to indicate the formation 
strength while the FIT is used to confirm that a target zone holds an acceptable integrity 
condition. 
The XLOT gives a more exact indication of the formation strength than the LOT. When the 
formation strength is the main objective of a test the XLOT is therefore run. 
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5 Influence of Casing Shoe Depth on SCP during Production 
The production phase may have special drilling requirements to prevent SCP to arise as a 
result of unfavorable casing shoe setting depth. This chapter will try to emphasize how 
setting depth should be chosen to suit the production phase. 
There are developed some common guidelines that should be followed to ensure well 
integrity. Well known guides are the Norsok standard D-010 “Well integrity in drilling 
operations” and the OLF-117 “Recommended Guidelines for Well Integrity”  
According to OLF - 117 the setting depth of casing shoes should be chosen with regards to 
formation strength. The well may then be able to withstand any influx from deeper 
formations during the lifetime of the well. Also designing and choosing equipment that will 
work properly under the environmental conditions present in the area minimizes the chance 
of developing SCP (OLF – 117 2011). 
There are also developed “new” drilling methods like Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD), Dual 
Gradient Drilling (DGD) and drilling with lower circulation rate to reduce the equivalent 
circulation density. All of these methods may allow drilling further than what would be 
possible using the conventional drilling method. Using lower circulation rate of mud while 
drilling may lead to a problem during cementation. The formation may not be able to 
withstand the necessary pressure required to perform a good cement job.3  
During drilling the casing shoe is set as deep as possible based on the mud weight and 
fracture gradient. To set a casing deeper may therefore be impossible without pushing 
boundaries and reducing safety factors. A solution on how to enable a deeper setting depth 
may be to add an extra casing string to the well design. This is done by setting one casing 
shallower than initially planned and increase the mud weight. The increased mud weight 
makes it possible to drill the next section deeper than initially planned and the additional can 
be set deeper. 
5.1 Cases 
In this chapter five generic cases with unfavorable intermediate casing shoe setting depth 
causing SCP will be presented. After each case a solution to how SCP may be avoided is 
proposed. Costs related to the different solutions have to be evaluated when deciding which 
option to choose.  
                                                     
3
 Information acquired through personal communication with Sigbjørn Sangesland 18.05.2012. 
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5.1.1 Case 1: Leak below production packer 
Figure 5.1 shows a typical candidate well for SCP. The 9 5/8 in. cement does not qualify as a 
primary barrier according the requirements in Norsok D-010. To qualify as a barrier TOC 
outside the 9 5/8 in. casing should be above the production packer. This defect occurs 
relatively frequently old wells and is therefore discussed here.  
The SCP in annulus “b” and possibly in annulus “c” shown in Figure 5.1 is happening because 
of two barrier element failures. The first failure is taking place in the 7 in. liner while the 
second failure is in the 9 5/8 in.  
 
Figure 5.1: Cement outside the 9 5/8 in. casing is set below the production packer. A leak 
below the production packer may therefor lead to fluid flowing into the formation or SCP in 
annulus “b” and/or annulus “c”. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier 
with red color. 
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If a leak occurs below the production packer, and the formation outside cannot withstand 
the pressure, the fluid may flow along the wellbore or into the formation. In some cases all 
the way to the surface. If fluid is allowed to flow along the 9 5/8 in. wellbore, SCP may build 
up in annulus “b”. Since annulus “b” is outside the secondary barrier envelope, SCP is very 
unfavorable here. 
A SCP situation may or may not occur in annulus “c” depending on the formation in which 
the 13 3/8 in. casing shoe is set and the cement quality. This scenario is more thoroughly 
described in case 3. 
Proposed Solution 
If the cement had been set above the production packer as shown in Figure 5.2, the problem 
might have been eliminated assuming the cement provided an impermeable seal.  Also if the 
13 3/8 in. casing and cement could have been redefined as a barrier, the SCP in annulus “b” 
would have been inside a barrier envelope and easier to control. 
 
Figure 5.2: Well cemented above production packer according to the Norsok standard D-010. 
Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
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Comparison 
It is not without reason the Norsok D-010 has defined that the cement needs to be over the 
production packer to be valid as a barrier. If the packer not is covered by cement and the 13 
3/8 in. casing cannot be redefined as a barrier, the well only has one valid barrier. According 
the Norsok standard there should always be at least two independent barrier envelopes in a 
well operation when a risk of uncontrolled outflow from the well to the external 
environment is present.  
 
5.1.2 Case 2: Casing shoe above unsealed high pressure formation 
In Figure 5.3 a high pressure formation has to be drilled through to reach the reservoir. To be 
able to drill conventionally through the high pressure formation, the 13 3/8 in. casing shoe 
was set just before entering the formation.  The next casing was set at a depth that made it 
impossible to seal off the high pressure zone by cement. The result was an open hole section 
in the high pressure formation. Because the pore pressure in the high pressure formation 
exceeded the annulus fluid pressure, formation fluids were entering the wellbore creating 
SCP in annulus “b”.  
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Figure 5.3: Fluid from the high pressure zone enters the well causing pressure build up in 
annulus “b”. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
Proposed Solution 
To solve the problem with SCP arising in annulus “b” because of influx of formation fluids an 
extra casing may be used as shown in Figure 5.4. The 9 5/8 in. casing is set just below the 
high pressure formation instead of just above the reservoir. The new setting depth of the 9 
5/8 in. casing makes it possible to seal off the high pressure formation. Since the 9 5/8 in. 
casing is set shallower a 7 in. production casing is set right above the reservoir. The 
production liner diameter is therefore reduced from 7 in. to 5 1/2 inches. 
This solution is in accordance with the recommendations from OLF – 117; “Formation zones 
which can give influx and pressure build up in annuli outside the established well barriers is 
often the most complex and challenging situations to manage and eliminate after SCP has 
occurred.” When the zone is properly isolated the drilling can be continued to the initially 
planned depth, but now with a smaller diameter. 
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Figure 5.4: The high pressure formation is properly sealed off preventing any inflow to the 
well. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
Comparison 
It can be seen in Figure 5.3 that it was rather a lack of barriers than barrier failure that 
caused SCP. In Figure 5.4 it is shown how an extra casing string may be inserted enabling a 
proper seal off of the formation. It is more likely to get the high pressure formation properly 
sealed off when the height of the cement column is reduced. If the required seal off height is 
too large, the weight of the column might exceed the formation strength. In Figure 5.3 the 
required height was quite large. By inserting an extra casing string the required height is 
reduced and a successful seal off is more likely. 
In the proposal above an extra production casing of 7 in. was inserted leading to a reduction 
of the production liner diameter from 7 to 5 1/2 inches. 
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To avoid the reduction in production liner diameter it may have been possible to insert an 11 
in. casing between the intermediate and production casing. If the casing strings are designed 
to withstand high pressure, the wall thickness will be quite large. The insertion of an extra 
casing string may therefor lead to a tight casing program. It may be harder to perform a 
good cement job in a tight annulus due to circulation rate. 
If possible a different drilling method like dual gradient or MPD may have been used instead 
of inserting an en additional casing. This may have allowed setting the 13 3/8 in. casing shoe 
below the high pressure formation and the production liner diameter would stay unchanged. 
To use a different drilling method the previous set casing shoe must be able to withstand the 
pressure it may be exposed to in case of a leak. 
To save steel the 9 5/8 in. intermediate casing may have been set as a liner as seen in Figure 
5.5. A liner can be used instead of a casing string extending all the way to the surface if the 
previous casing string is designed any SCP that may occur. 
If the burst resistance of a casing is increased, so is the wall thickness. A large diameter pipe 
needs a greater thickness than a small diameter pipe to resist the same amount of pressure. 
It may therefore be favorable to run the casing all the way to the surface instead of 
increasing the diameter of the previous casing string. 
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Figure 5.5: The 9 5/8 in. casing is set as a liner instead of a casing going all the way to the 
surface. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
 
5.1.3 Case 3: Casing shoe set in weak formation 
In Figure 5.6 a situation where two formations with different formation strength are located 
close to the setting depth of the 13 3/8 in. casing is shown. The 13 3/8 in. casing is set in the 
top formation i.e. the weakest formation of the two. During production a leak occurs in the 
production liner and in the 9 5/8 in. casing below the casing hanger packer. Reservoir fluid is 
allowed to flow and build up pressure in annulus “b”. The weak formation cannot withstand 
the reservoir pressure and fractures below the 13 3/8 in. casing shoe. Because of a bad 
formation/cement bond or channels in the cement fluid is allowed to flow into annulus “c” 
creating SCP here as well. 
If the leak occurs in other parts of the well, other sections of the well path may experience 
the same challenges. 
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Figure 5.6: 13 3/8 in. casing shoe is set in weak formation. The casing shoe and formation 
cannot handle the pressure of the leaked fluid. The shoe and surrounding formation cracks 
and fluid is allowed to enter the formation and/or migrate along the 13 3/8 in. casing into 
annulus “c”. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
 
Proposed Solution 
If the casing shoe can be set in different formations, OLF recommends setting the shoe in the 
formation that can withstand reservoir pressure. 
Assuming the strong formation could withstand reservoir pressure, the casing shoe should 
have been set there instead. By utilizing a different drilling method it may be possible to drill 
far enough so that the casing shoe can be set in the strong formation. An illustration of 
casing shoe set in the strong formation can be seen in Figure 5.7.  
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Figure 5.7: Casing shoe set in the strong formation. 13 3/8 in. casing and cement can be 
redefined as a well barrier hence SCP can be monitored and controlled. Primary barrier is 
marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
 
If a more advanced drilling method not enables deep enough drilling, an extra casing or liner 
may be applied. Setting the 13 3/8 in. casing shallower and adding an 11 in. casing may allow 
the 9 5/8 in. casing to be drilled deeper and set in the strong formation as shown in Figure 
5.8. 
Setting the shoe in the strong formation makes it possible to redefine the 13 3/8 in.  casing 
and cement to a well barrier if required. The redefinition is possible because the formation 
in the open hole section between the 9 5/8 in. cement and the 13 3/8 in. casing qualifies as a 
well barrier element.  
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Figure 5.8: An additional 11 in. casing string is used to make it possible to set the 9 5/8 in. 
casing in a formation that can handle reservoir pressure. Primary barrier is marked with blue 
and secondary barrier with red color. 
 
Comparison 
As mentioned in the discussion in case 2, to insert an extra casing in the casing program may 
involve challenges related to casing thickness and cementing. An option if whether further 
drilling or inserting the 11 in. casing is possible is to set a 9 5/8 in. casing at the planned 11 
in. casing depth. A 7 in. production casing may be set above the reservoir and reduce the 
production liner diameter to 5 1/2.  
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5.1.4 Case 4: Leak below Production Casing Shoe 
If a leak occurs below the production casing shoe it will not be restrained by the secondary 
barrier. This may be an extra unfortunate situation and should by all means be avoided. 
Figure 5.9 shows two possible origins of SCP. One leak has origin directly from the reservoir 
along the 7 in casing. The other leak has origin in production liner and cement failure. The 
formation in which the 9 5/8 in. casing shoe is set in cannot withstand reservoir pressure. 
Reservoir fluids are therefore allowed to flow into the formation and along the 9 5/8 in. 
cement into annulus “b”.  
 
Figure 5.9: Leak below liner hanger packer migrating into annulus “a”, “b” and surrounding 
formation. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
Proposed Solution 
If it is found out that the formation strength at the chosen setting depth for the 9 5/8 in. 
casing not is sufficient to withstand reservoir pressure, the casing shoe needs to be set 
deeper (since formation strength usually is increasing with depth). If no part of the 
formation can take the pressure, the casing shoe may be set in the cap rock. The original 9 
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5/8 in. casing can be extended by using optional drilling methods or an additional casing 
string can be utilized.  
In Figure 5.10 it is shown how the 9 5/8 in. production casing is set in the cap rock to prevent 
fluids from escaping and crating SCP in annulus “b”. 
 
Figure 5.10: The 9 5/8 in. Casing is set deeper to extend the secondary barrier so that it 
protects leaks from below casing hanger packer. Primary barrier is marked with blue and 
secondary barrier with red color. 
 
Adding an extra casing string after the 9 5/8 in. casing may affect the liner diameter. Figure 
5.11 shows how the liner diameter is reduced from 7 in. to 5 1/2 in. because a 7 in. 
production casing is inserted. Inserting an additional casing earlier in the drilling process may 
be an option that allows the production casing to be set deeper. It may also not affect the 
production liner diameter.   
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Figure 5.11: A 7 in. production casing is added after the 9 5/8 in. to extend the secondary 
barrier so that it can prevent leaks from under the liner hanger packer to travel into annulus 
“b” and the surrounding formation. Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary 
barrier with red color. 
 
Comparison 
In the well planning phase the different formation strengths are supposed to be tested. If it 
is found out that the in the formation above the reservoir cannot withstand reservoir 
pressure, a casing planned to be set there should be reconsidered.  
If the leak path is directly from the reservoir along the 7 in. cement it may be hard to remove 
by redesigning the well. To remove this leak by setting the production casing in the caprock, 
the casing shoe has to be completely tight.   
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6 Discussion 
Much work has been dedicated to the study of SCP such as Bourgoyne et al. 1999 and 
Wojtanowicz 2001. When it comes to explaining how SCP arises, most research has its main 
focus on equipment failure, cement quality and cementing performance. Very little is done 
on the relation between casing shoe setting depth and SCP. 
The common practice today is often to drill a well with consideration to only situations that 
may arise during drilling. In this study it has been tried to reveal whether the well would 
have been drilled differently if the production phase had been taken into consideration 
during the design phase. 
Some factors contributing to the decision of casing shoe setting depth today are: 
 Pore pressure 
 Fracture gradient 
 Protection of freshwater aquifers 
 Lost circulations zones 
 Salt beds and low pressure zones that may cause stuck pipe 
 Kick criteria 
These factors are important and should be considered to ensure a safe drilling operation. 
Since the well has more than one stage during its lifetime, factors that can contribute to 
improve the safety should also be implemented during well planning and design. Some  
important factors that are advantageous during the production phase are:  
 Possible to redefine barriers 
 Set shoe in strong formation so that it can withstand situations with high pressure 
 Avoid open hole sections in high pressure and high permeable formation 
 
Cementing 
Many SCP situations that occur because of fluid migration between casing layers is a result 
of bad conversion between TOC and the previous casing shoe setting depth. If the cement 
column had been higher, or the casing shoe had been set deeper, many SCP situations may 
have been avoided.  
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If the well had been completed with completely overlapping between all cement columns 
and casing strings, the problem with SCP related to casing shoe setting depth might have 
been avoided. Figure 6.1 shows a well design where inflow into annulus from surrounding 
formations is prevented by overlapping between cement and previous casing strings. This 
assumes that the cement sheet is flawless hence no channels, good cement-
formation/casing bond, etc. As previously discussed the chance of a perfect cement seal is 
very small. 
 
Figure 6.1:  Well design preventing inflow from surrounding formation into annulus if the 
cement is perfect without channels and the cement-formation/casing bond is good etc. 
Primary barrier is marked with blue and secondary barrier with red color. 
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It is not common practice to have overlapping sections between cement and casing strings in 
all parts of the well. This may be due to: 
 Cement expenses and complications related to obtaining a good cement sheet when 
cementing over large intervals.  
 Much easier to do a sidetrack in an open hole than in a cemented section.  
 Sometimes it may be better that excessive pressure has the opportunity to flow into 
the formation rather than building up inside the annulus threatening to break casing 
strings and in worst case the wellhead causing a blowout.  
In order to qualify as a well barrier the cement has to fulfill the requirements listed in Table 
B. 8 in Appendix B. 
There may be several different reasons to why the cement is not satisfying the criterion. It 
may be. 
 The required height of the cement column creates too large pressure on the 
formation surrounding the casing shoe 
 Annulus may be too tight, not possible to squeeze cement into the small space 
 Cement may break down the formation 
A solution on how to get the cement column high enough is to use squeeze cementing. The 
bottom part is cemented first, then the casing can be perforated at TOC and the next section 
is cemented. One of the disadvantages related to squeeze cementing is that the perforated 
casing creates a possible leak path.  
 
6.1 General Discussion 
In this thesis there are basically two types of solutions proposed which can be used to 
prevent SCP from arising because of unfavorable casing shoe setting depth; 
 Additional casing/liner 
 Drill deeper using optional drilling methods like MPD, dual gradient drilling, etc. 
Which method to use has to be evaluated in each individual case. If further drilling with the 
same mud weight is impossible or too dangerous, an additional casing or liner may be 
applied. Whether to use a liner or casing extending all the way to the surface depends on the 
pressure resistance in the previous set casing, additional risks, tools and complexities 
compared to capital savings. 
Inserting an additional casing between the casing strings in the initially planned casing 
program may in some cases not be very favorable. The extra casing may lead to a too tight 
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casing program resulting in difficulties during cementing. If the annulus is very narrow the 
required displacement rate may be larger than what is allowed by casing shoe and 
formation.  
To avoid a narrow casing program all planned casing strings may be shifted upwards i.e. the 
diameter used for the production liner ex. 7 in. is used on the production casing, and the 
production liner is assigned a smaller diameter ex. 5 1/2 inches.  
Another option is, if possible, to design the surface casing with a larger diameter so that all 
following casing strings may have a larger diameter. This has to be planned from the very 
beginning. Drilling larger holes is both more expensive and requires more engine power. It is 
therefore desirable to drill with the smallest possible diameter. 
If the problem can be solved by using an optional drilling method, this may be advantageous. 
Extra costs related to the additional casing are saved and the production liner diameter may 
stay unchanged. 
SCP is often a result of bad conversion between casing shoe setting depth and TOC. This 
means that eliminating the deficiency in one of them may remove SCP.  
Deficiency for casing shoe setting depth may include, but is not limited to:  
 Casing is not set deep enough  
 Casing is not designed to withstand the pressure it may be exposed to   
 Casing may be set in a formation that cannot withstand high pressure  
Cement deficiency includes, but is not limited to: 
 Cement column not is high enough according to the Norsok standard  
 Cement is not sealing high pressure zones or weak formations 
 Cement failures mentioned in chapter 2.2.2 
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7 Conclusion 
There may be many causes of sustained casing pressure. Through the well integrity survey 
performed by the Petroleum Safety Authorities, the most common causes for SCP are 
related to:  
 Well barrier failures in tubing 
 Failures in annulus safety valve 
 Deficiency in cement and casing 
When SCP has arisen it may be hard to get rid of. It is therefore more desirable to prevent it 
from arising by performing the drilling and casing setting after a thoroughly planned well 
design. 
How to best prevent SCP from arising is to: 
 Perform thorough investigation of the underground 
 Know where hazardous formations are located 
 Plan ahead and know where it is advantageous to set the casing and why it is 
advantageous 
 Know the conversion between TOC and casing shoe setting depth 
 Larger surface casing to allow insertion of an additional casing string without creating 
a tight casing program or affecting the production liner and cement process.  
The best way of eliminating influx of formation fluid from formations along the wellbore is to 
identify them in the initial well design planning and when cementing, make sure the annulus 
is properly cemented.  
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Further Work 
This has been a generic study with generic cases where SCP was a result of “wrong” casing 
shoe depth. In the future information from real wells that may be suffering of SCP because 
of non-ideal casing shoe setting depth should be to gather and evaluated. 
There is also a need to perform an economic study to make an estimate on how much the 
extra cost would be for the prevention of SCP. 
In this thesis only the production phase has been compared with the drilling phase to see if 
the “ideal production well design” differed from the “ideal drilling well design”. What is not 
taken into consideration is the phase after the well is plugged and abandoned (P&A). It 
should be investigated whether the casing shoe setting depth has any influence on P&A 
operations. To be able to create the optimal well design the whole life cycle of the well 
should be considered.  
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Abbreviations 
DGD  Dual Gradient Drilling 
FIT  Formation Integrity Test 
LOP  Leak off Pressure 
LOT  Leak off Test 
MMS  Mineral Management Service 
MPD  Managed Pressure Drilling 
NCF  Norwegian Continental Shelf 
Norsok Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon 
OLF  Norwegian Oil Industry Association (Oljeindustriens Landsforening) 
P&A  Plug and Abandon 
PSA  Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
SCP  Sustained Casing Pressure 
s.g  Specific Gravity 
TOC  Top of Cement 
WBE  Well Barrier Element 
WIF  Well Integrity Forum 
WBS  Well Barrier Schematic 
XLOT  Extended Leak off Test 
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Appendix  
Appendix A 
Categorization System 
To promote a common understanding of the integrity of a well the well integrity forum (WIF) 
designed a categorization system to classify wells based on their integrity status. A common 
system is beneficial for both operators who can categorize and rank wells during operations 
and the PSA who can summarize well integrity across the NCS. The well categorization 
system covers all wells in operation. (OLF – 117 2011) 
During the development it was emphasized to make the system as simple as possible. Based 
on the double barrier policy system outlined in the regulations and the Norsok D-010 
Standard, WIF proposed the 4-cathegory traffic-light system Figure A. 1. It was made up of 
four colours; green, yellow, orange and red. Green and yellow represents acceptable wells 
while orange and red are non-compliant wells with integrity problems. (OLF – 117 2011) 
 
 
Figure A. 1: Barrier Category. (OLF – 117 2011) 
 
Depending on age, complexity, presence of abnormalities and non-conformances different 
information is required to categorize the well.  
To perform a categorization of wells different information is required.  
OLF has developed a list of information required to evaluate and categorize a well. The list 
can include, but is not limited to: 
 Information about well type and well service 
 Well barrier schematic 
 Well construction details, including measured and/or predicted formation strength 
B 
 
 Design pressures, test pressures and pressure limits 
 Operational limits 
 Flowing and shut in pressures & temperatures 
  Fluid type in tubing and annuli 
 Annulus pressure and pressure trends 
 Findings from well interventions and preventive maintenance tests 
 Known deviations, abnormalities or non-conformances 
 
If abnormalities and/or conformances are present even further information is required to 
categorize the well. These can be found in OLF-117. 
Green 
The well integrity status fulfils standards and has two barriers as is required according to the 
two-barrier principle. (OLF – 117 2011) 
Yellow 
The well integrity status fulfils standards and has two barriers as is required according to the 
two-barrier principle. The well has obtained the yellow colour due to presence of one or 
more integrity anomalies. Operations can be kept up. (OLF – 117 2011) 
Orange 
The well does not satisfy standards and the integrity problem is of such dimension that I 
cannot be neglected. The integrity problem is usually further investigated and the risk 
associated with the defect of the well is evaluated. For orange wells the failure usually lies 
within the primary barrier. (OLF – 117 2011) 
Red 
The well does not satisfy standards and the integrity problem is of such dimension that I 
cannot be neglected. The integrity problem is usually further investigated and the risk 
associated with the defect of the well is evaluated. In addition to failure of the primary 
barrier, red wells suffer from failure or degradation of the second barrier as well. (OLF – 117 
2011) 
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Appendix B 
This appendix contains the acceptance criterion tables for the different well barrier elements 
defined by Norsok. 
Table B. 1 explains what the different features in the table means and can be used when 
reading the following acceptance tables.  
 
Table B. 1: Methodology for the following tables is described. 
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Acceptance table for the casing string barrier 
Table B. 2: Acceptance table for casing string. (NORSOK standard D-010 2004, Table 2) 
 
  
E 
 
Acceptance table for wellhead 
Table B. 3: Acceptance table for wellhead. (NORSOK standard D-010 2004, Table 5)  
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Acceptance table for the production packer well barrier 
Table B. 4: Acceptance table for production packer. (NORSOK standard D-010 2004, Table 7) 
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Acceptance table for surface controlled sub-surface safety valve (SCSSV) 
Table B. 5: Acceptance table for surface controlled sub-surface safety valve. (NORSOK 
standard D-010 2004, Table 8) 
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Acceptance table for the tubing hanger 
Table B. 6: Acceptance table for tubing hanger. (NORSOK standard D-010 2004, Table 10) 
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Acceptance table for well head/annulus access valve 
Table B. 7: Acceptance table for well head/annulus access valve. (NORSOK standard D-010 
2004, Table 12) 
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Acceptance table for the casing cement well barrier 
Table B. 8: Acceptance table for casing cement. (NORSOK standard D-010 2004, Table 22) 
 
  
K 
 
Acceptance table for the completion string 
Table B. 9: Acceptance table for the completion string. (NORSOK standard D-010 2004, Table 
25) 
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Acceptance table for surface production tree 
Table B. 10: Acceptance table for surface production tree. (NORSOK standard D-010 2004, 
Table 33) 
 
 
